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JOINDER AND MISJOINDER OF PARTIES

NON-JOINDER AND MISJOINDER OF PARTIES IN
COMION-LAW ACTIONS

By

HENRY CRAIG JONES* AND LEO CARLIN**
INTRODUCTION

The common-law difficulties as to the joinder of parties in actions at law arose chiefly from two causes: (1) The common-law
conceptions as to the nature of the substantive rights of persons
having joint interests and under joint liabilities, and of persons
having several interests and under several liabilities. (2) The
common-law conception of a cause of action as an entity, and the
resulting requirement that the judgment must be in solido. The
rigid concept of the common law is that there may be only one
judgment, and such judgment must be entered in favor of all the
plaintiffs and against all the defendants, thus differing from the
more liberal equity practice, where decrees may be entered for less
or against less than all the parties, and different decrees may be
entered in favor of -or against different parties. The rule as to
plaintiffs is very well expressed by Eyre, C. J., in Scott v. God-

win,' as follows:
"Many plaintiffs can have but one right, having but one
interest and one cause of action; which ought to be, and is indivisible, admitting of but one satisfaction."
The only substantial exceptions to the rule at law that it is
necessary for a single judgment to be entered for all the plaintiffs
as a group against all the defendants as a group, are found (1) in
actions against joint tortfeasors and (2) in contract actions where
a defendant has a personal defense.
NON-JOINDER OF PLAINTIFFS IN ACTIONS EX CONTRACTU.

In contract actions, at common law, all joint promisees must join.
* Dean of the College of Law, University of Illinois, formerly Dean of the College
of Law, West Virginia University.
**Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
1 B. & P. 71 (1797).
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One ought not to be allowed to sue alone for the whole of that of
which he is entitled only to a part.2 Several promisees must sue
separately.3 There can not be joint and several promisees1 Under
the rule that all persons having a joint interest in the recovery must
join as plaintiffs, the non-joinder of a necessary plaintiff is fatal to
the action.' If such defect be apparent on the face of the declaration, it is ground for a demurrer, a motion in arrest of judgment,
or a writ of error, because the declaration does not disclose a cause
of action in favor of the plaintiff or plaintiffs suing, but only a
cause of action in favor of a different group of persons.8
In West Virginia, the question appears first to have arisen in
The Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Fristoe,7 where the plaintiff sued
alone on a promise to pay money made by the defendant for the
joint benefit of plaintiff insurance company and another insurance
company. It was held that the plaintiff could not sue alone. Quoting from Tucker's Commentaries," the court says:
"When the contract is made with several, whether it were
under seal or by parol, if their legal interest were joint, they
must all, if living, join in an action in form ex contractu, for
the breach of it."
It does not appear whether the non-joinder was apparent on the
face of the declaration, but seemingly it was not. The defendant
had pleaded non assumpsit. On proof of the fact that the promise
was made jointly to the two promisees, the lower court, being of
opinion that the evidence failed to sustain the declaration, on
plaintiff's refusal to take a non-suit, excluded the evidence and
directed a verdict for the defendant. This judgment was affirmed.
It will be noted that the course pursued by the trial court in this
case is in accord with the regular West Virginia practice. In many
jurisdictions, under such circumstances, the plaintiff would have
been peremptorily non-suited. e In West Virginia, however, it has
been decided that a plaintiff can not be made to suffer an involuntary non-suit at the trial."0 Hlence the uniform practice has been,
when the evidence is insufficient, to sustain a motion to exclude the
2 DICEY, PARTIES, Rule 13.
' Idem, Rule 10.
Idem, Rule 14.
Idem, Rule 115.
6 Willoughby v. Willoughby, 5 N. H. 244 (1830) ; DICEY, PARTIES, 502; AmS,
CASES ON PLEADING, ed. 1905, 138; 15 ENCYC. PL. & PRAC. 564.
7 53 W Va. 361, 44 S. E. 253 (1903).
Vol. 2, ed. 1837, 210.
9 3 BouvIER s LAW DICTIONARY, 2362; 4 MINoR, INSTITUTES, 782.
'o Carrico v. West Virginia Cent etc. Ry. Co., 35 W Va. 389, 394, 14 S.
E. 12
(1891) ; Marcus v. McClure, 63 W. Va. 215, 59 S. E. 1055 (1907).
See 4 MmnoR,

INSTITUTES,

782.
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evidence and then, upon plaintiff's refusal to take a non-suit, to
direct a verdict for the defendant.
The question next arose in Sandusky v. Oil Company.11 To
support the declaration, which contained only the common counts,
the plaintiff, who sued alone, offered in evidence an oil lease between the defendant oil company on one side and plaintiff and his
wife on the other side. On the question as to who must join, the
court held that,
"Where a promise-is to two persons to pay a single amount,
one of them can not maintain an action for his share of the
whole, but they must sue jointly."
As to the mode of objecting for such non-joinder, the court,
quoting from Tucker's Commentaries, 2 says:
"In all cases of contracts, if it appears upon the face of the
pleadings that there are other obligees, covenantees, or parties
to the contract, who ought to be, but are not joined in the action, it is fatal on demurrer, or on motion in arrest of judgment,
or on error; and though the objection may not appear on the
face of the pleadings, the defendant may avail himself of it
either by plea in abatement, or as a ground of non-suit in the
trial upon the plea of the general issue."
The Supreme Court held that the judgment entered for the
plaintiff in the lower court be reversed, because of the fatal variance
between the declaration and the evidence. Owing to the fact that
bringing in the non-joined party by way of amendment would have
created a new and different cause of action, the case was not remanded for a new trial but the action was summarily dismissed.
The dismissal of the action is virtually an involuntary non-suit
in the Supreme Court, and in this respect differs from the usual
West Virginia practice. 13 Of course, the only remedy for the
plaintiff was to sue out a new writ. However harsh the consequences of the conclusion reached, it must be conceded that no
amendment for the purpose of curing the non-joinder in this case
was proper under strict common-law principles. It is fundamental
1 63

W. Va. 260, 264, 59 S. E. 1082 (1907).
Vol. 2, ed. 1837, 210.
supra. The regular practice would have been to remand the case
to the lower court for further proceedings. There the plaintiff could have taken a
voluntary non-sulL If he had merely neglected to proceed to trial when the case
was remanded, his cause would have been discontinued under the CODE, ch. 125,
§ 6. On the other hand, if he had proceeded to a second trial, since he could not have
22

3 See note 10,

amended his declaration, he would have

most certainly suffered a

directed verdict

against him. The West Virginia cases, however, are not in accord as to when a
case will be remanded when a verdict is set aside in the Supreme Court. See Ruffner v. Dutchess Ins. Co., 59 W. Va. 432, 53 S. E. 943, 115 Am. St. Rep. 924 (1906) ;
Soward v, Car Co., 66 W. Va. 266, 66 S. E. 329 (1909) ; Weeks v. Railway Co.,
68 W. Va. 284, 69 S. E. 805 (3910).
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in the law of amendments that a declaration can not be amended
so as to change the cause of action. It would seem obvious that an
action based upon a promise from A to B involves a different
cause of action from one based upon a promise from A to B and C.
The necessity for the joinder as plaintiffs of all parties in joint
interest is again asserted in Hatfield v. Cabell County Court, 4
although the case is really decided upon the principle that payment
to one of the joint promisees was payment and a discharge as to
all. On the same principle, it would seem that a part-payment
to one strictly ought to operate only as a joint part-payment and
5
partial discharge as to all. However, in Martin v. Reiniger, it
was held that, where the obligor pays to one of two joint obligees
his share of the common debt, such payment effects a severance
whereby the other obligee may sue alone for the share due him
under the contract. One who obtains a share in the obligee's interest after the contract is made, of course, need not be joined,' 6 for
at common law an assignee can sue only in the name of the
7
assignor.
It would seem that chapter 125, section 58, of the West Virginia
Code, providing that,
"Whenever in any case a complete determination of the controversy can not be had without the presence of other parties,
the court may cause them to be made parties to the action
or suit by amendment,"
would give the court authority to cure non-joinder of contract
plaintiffs by amendment, but no instance is noted where a litigant
invoked the aid of the statute for such a purpose. 18 Hence it may
safely be deduced from the authorities discussed that the strict
common-law procedure with reference to non-joinder of plaintiffs
in contract actions remains in full force and effect in West Vir9
ginia.1
14 75 W. Va. 595, 84 S. E. 335 (1915).

15 74 W. Va. 439, 82 S. E. 221 (1914).
16 Sims v. Carpenter, Frazier & Co., 68 W. Va. 223, 69 S. E. 794 (1910).
17 Bentley v,. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 40 W. Va. 729, 23 S. E. 584 (1895) ; Miller V.
The WEST VIRGINIA CODE, c, 99,
(1920).
Starcher, 86 W. Va. 90, 102 S. E. 809
§ 14, allowing the action to be brought in the name of the assignee, in certain InSee
stances, does not prohibit suit in the name of the assignor as at common law.

same cases.

18 See i nfra where this statute is discussed in connection with non-joinder and misjoinder of contract defendants.
C. 134, § 3, would seem to be sufficient
t9 The terms of the WEST VIRGINIA COD,
to cure a non-joinder or a misjoinder of parties apparent on the face of the declaration, unless advantage should be taken of the defect in the first instance by demur-

rer.

However, no cases are noted where the court was asked to apply the statute to

joinder of parties, and, under the comparatively strict construction which the court
has in general placed upon this statute, it Is doubtful whether it would render any
aid in this respect. A mere misjoinder of actions, In the absence of a demurrer, Is

cured by the statute.

Malsby -. Lanark Co., 55 W. Va. 484, 47 S. E. 358 (1904) ;
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In Virginia, however, in the Code of 1919, the common-law
consequences of non-joinder and misjoinder of parties are practically abolished. This statute,2" enacted for the first time in 1919, and
largely conforming to the English and New Jersey practice acts,
provides as follows:
"No action or suit shall abate or be defeated by the nonjoinder or misjoinder of parties, plaintiff or defendant, but
whenever such non-joinder or misjoinder shall be made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, new parties may be added and
parties misjoined may be dropped by order of the court at any
stage of the cause as the ends of justice may require; but such
new party shall not be added unless it shall be made to appear
that he is a resident of this state and the place of such residence be stated with convenient certainty, nor shall he be added
if it shall appear that by reason of Chapter 232 (Statute of
Frauds) or Chapter 238 (Statute of Limitations) the action
could not be maintained against him."
MISJOINDER OF PARTIES PLAINTIFF IN ACTION EX CONTRACTU.

It has already been noted 2' that several promisees must sue separately and that there can not be joint and several promises. Only
persons having a joint interest under the contract may be joined.
Objection to a misjoinder, if apparent on the face of the declaration,
may properly be raised by demurrer at common law, and likewise
is fatal on motion in arrest of judgment or on writ of error.2 If
the misjoinder is not apparent on the face of the declaration, the
objection may be raised under the general issue,23 by a motion for
a non-suit or a directed verdict. In other words, the practical
effect of a misjoinder of contract plaintiffs, on principles already
discussed, is the same as that of a non-joinder.
Only one instance is noted where the question of misjoinder of
contract plaintiffs has come before the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals. In Pollack v. House and Herman,24 a surviving
Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. wysor, 82 Va. 250 (1886).
Likewise, objection to
an ordinary variance between the declaration and the proof must be taken at the trial,
or else it is waived. Shenandoah Valley R. Co. v. Moose, 83 Va. 827, S S. E. 796
(1887) ; Bertha Zinc Co. v. Martin's Admr., 93 Va. 791, 22 S. B. 869 (1895) ; Long
V. Campbell, 37 W. Va. 665, 17 S. E. 197 (1893) ; Long v. Pocahontas Consolidated
Collieries Co., 83 W. Va. 380, 98 S. E. 424 (1919).
But It will be noted that in all
these cases the variance was of such a nature that it properly could have been cured
by an amendment of the declaration. At least in those instances where the non-joinder
or the misjoinder can not be cured by amendment, there are strong reasons to believe that the defect would not be waived by failure to demur.
= VA. CoDE, 1919, § 6102.
Notes 3 and 4, supra.
31 Cyc. 294; 15 ENCYC. PL. & PRAc., 580-581.
Starrett v. Gault, 165 Ill. 99, 46 N. E. 220 (1896) ; 31 CYc. 691.
84 W. Va. 421, 100 S. E. 275 (1919).
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lessor and the representative of a deceased co-lessor improperly
joined in an action for the recovery of rent. A demurrer to the
declaration was sustained by the trial court, partly on the ground
of such misjoinder. When the demurrer was sustained, the case
was immediately certified to the Supreme Court, where the judgment of the lower court as to such misjoinder was affirmed. The
Supreme Court refused to decide whether an amendment as to the
misjoinder was proper or whether the action should be dismissed
on the ground that the declaration was incurably bad, holding that
it was without jurisdiction to pass upon this question until the
lower court had acted. It is believed, however, that, under the
authority of Sandusky v. Oil Gompanay, 25 to permit an amendment
by way of dismissing the misjoined party would be to create a new
cause of action, and hence that the only proper course to pursue
in the lower court was to take a non-suit and sue out a new writ.
If A v. B is a different cause of action from A v. B and C, then
certainly A and B v. C is a different cause of action from A v. C.
It will be recalled that in the. Sandusky Case the Supreme Court
took cognizance of the fact that a non-joinder of a contract plaintiff
could not be cured by amendment, and hence summarily dismissed
the action, although the non-joinder did not appear on the face of
the pleadings and was not raised on demurrer. It is a little difficult to see why the Supreme Court could not, with even more propriety, have determined in the Pollack Case, where the question
arose on demurrer, whether the declaration was amendable, instead
of remanding this question to the lower court.
The Pollack Case is authority to the effect that a misjoinder of
contract plaintiffs is ground for demurrer to the declaration in
West Virginia. Although other phases of the question do not
seem to have come up for adjudication, it may safely be assumed,
in the absence of any remedial statute, that the consequences of
misjoinder of contract plaintiffs in West Virginia are those which
prevail under the common law.
In Virginia, even prior to the radical revision of 1919, a statute
had been enacted which practically abolished the common-law consequences of misjoinder of parties. This statute,2" enacted in 1895-6,
reads as follows:
"Wherever it shall appear in any action at law or suit in
equity heretofore or hereafter instituted, by the pleadings or
otherwise that there has been a misjoinder of parties, plaintiff
2 Note 11, supra.

VA. CODE 1904, § 3258a.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol28/iss3/4
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or defendant, the court may order the action or suit to abate
as to any party improperly joined and to proceed by or against
the others as if such misjoinder had not been made, and the
court may make such provision as to costs and continuances as
may be just."
The Virginia Supreme Court, construing this statute, has held that
a misjoinder of plaintiffs is no longer a ground for demurrer,
and that the word "may" in the act means "must.12 7 The provisions of this act are now covered by section 6102 of the Virginia
Code of 1919, already quoted, which applies to non-joinder as well
as misjoinder. There are no equivalent statutes in West Virginia.
NON-JOINDER OF PARTIES DEFENDANT IN ACTION EX CONTRACTU.

At common law, Dicey states the substantive rule to be that
"where several persons are jointly liable on a contract, they must
all be sued in an action for the breach thereof, i. e. joint contractors
must be sued jointly.' '28 Where the obligation is joint and several,
all the obligors must be joined or each must be sued severally.2 9
Where it is apparent on the face of the declaration that a cocontractor has not been joined as defendant and is alive and within
the jurisdiction, the cases are in accord that a general demurrer will
lie at common law because the declaration does not state a cause of
action against the defendant or defendants sued, but only against
a distinct group of persons.30 Where it does not appear on the
face of the declaration that the non-joined party is alive, it has been
held that the objection can only be raised by a special demurrer. 31
In other words, where the declaration is silent as to whether the
party is dead or alive, a special demurrer is necessary, the defect
being regarded as merely one of form.
Where the non-joinder of a co-contractor as defendant is not
apparent on the face of the declaration, the defense at common law
originally was asserted upon a traverse to the declaration, ordinarily
the general issue, the result being a non-suit upon the production
of evidence showing the non-joinder; but it was later decided that
the objection must be taken by a plea in abatement. 32 Subsequently,
the Statute 3 & 4 William IV provided that a plea in abatement
'

Lee & Wife v. Mutual Reserve Fund Co., 97 Va. 160, 33 S. B. 556 (1899).

21 DICEY, PARTIES, Rule 49.

Rule 50.
CASES ON PLEADmG, ed. 1905, 140.
31 Burgess v. Abbott, 6 Hill 135 (N. Y. 1843).
32 AhES, CASES ON PLEADING, ed. 1905, 142; SUNDERLAND,
"LAW PLEADING, 806.
-DIdem,
0 AES,
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for non-joinder of other defendants should be accompanied by an
affidavit stating the residence in England of the omitted defendant,"3 the practical effect of which was to prevent the resident
debtor from objecting to the non-joinder of his co-debtor unless the
latter resided within the jurisdiction. The general common-law
rule in the United States is that, where the non-joinder of defendants is not apparent on the face of the declaration, objection must
be raised by a plea in abatement alleging that the persons not joined
are living and resident within the jurisdiction of the court.
The question of non-joinder of contract defendants came up for
discussion in many of the early Virginia cases, a number of which
are binding authority in West Virginia. The earliest case touching upon the question seems to be Brown v. Belches,"4 where it is
said that, where less than all the partners are sued, those who
have not been joined can plead in abatement, and that judgment
will be entered against them if they do not discover by a plea in
abatement who the other parties are.
In Leftwich v. Berkely, 5 it was held, in an action on a sheriff's
joint and several bond, that each obligor must be sued singly or
else that all must be sued together. Since more than one but less
than all were sued, the judgment was reversed. There was no
demurrer and an issue was tried by a jury on a plea of conditions
performed. The non-joinder, however, appeared on the face of
the declaration and the objection was heard on a writ of error,
the court thus in effect holding that the defect was not waived by
failure to demur nor cured by verdict. Doubtless, the defendants
could have demurred successfully in the first instance. In Newman
v.Graham,36 it was held that, in an action of debt against one obligor
only, if the declaration describes the bond as joint and does not
state the other obligor to be dead, it is a fatal error, though
not pleaded in abatement, and is not cured by verdict. Judgment
was entered for the defendant. In this case, clearly the defendant
could have demurred.
It will be noted that in these cases a defendant is permitted to
object to a non-joinder on a writ of error, and of course would be
permitted to do so on demurrer, where the declaration merely fails
to show that the absent party is dead but does not affirmatively
1 CHTTY PLEADNG, 46.
1 Wash. 9 (1791).

A similar decision is reached in Barnett v. Watson, 1 Wash.

372 (1794).
35 1 Hen. & Munf. 61 (1806).
(1810).

3 3 Munf. 187 (1812).
is in accord.

The same was held in Newell v. Wood, 1 Munf. 555

Watson's Executor v. Lynch's Heirs, 4 Munf. 95 (1813),

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol28/iss3/4

8

Jones and Carlin: Non-Joinder and Misjoinder of Parties in Common-Law Actions
NON-JOINDER AND MISJOINDER OF PARTIES

show that he is living. This is contrary to the common-law rule
announced in Burgess v. Abbott 37 to the effect that only a special
demurrer is proper unless the declaration shows affirmatively that
the absent party is living. The latter decision criticises the Virginia decisions in this respect, indicating that they are based on
English cases involving a scire facias to revive a judgment, which
are not in point. However, it would seem that the common-law
presumption that a person is presumed to be living until he is
shown to be dead ought to prevail, and that on this presumption
the Virginia decisions are correct. Otherwise, since objections to
formal defects requiring a special demurrer in the Virginias are
abolished, a defendant would be unable to demur at all in such a
situation.
In Walmsley v. Lindenberger,38 the plaintiff sued one only of two
partners, alleging in his declaration that the partner whom he did
not sue was an infant. The defendant demurred. The court held
that, because the infant partner's contract was not void but only
voidable, he also should have been sued, and, therefore, the demurrer should be sustained.
On the. question whether objection to a non-joinder not apparent
on the face of the declaration can be raised under a plea in bar,
the Virginia decisions have consistently followed the later commonlaw rule. In Prunty v. Mitchel and (obbs, 39 upon a plea of non
assumpsit, the court instructed the jury that if they believed from
the evidence that the contract, for the breach of which plaintiff
sued, was made with a partnership firm, of which Finney was a
member, in addition to the two defendants, they should find for
the defendants. The appellate court says:
"In the case of defendants, if a party be omitted who is
liable to be sued jointly with the defendants, the objection
can be taken only by plea in abatement, verified by affidavit.
1 Chitty on Pleading, p. 53, 16th A. Ed.
"Mr. Robinson says: 'Pleas in abatement on account of
all contracting parties not being sued, were first made necessary in the time of Lord Mansfield. It was then adjudged
(in 1770) that the defendant must say in his plea who the
partners are, and that if he does not plead the matter in
abatement, the objection is waived.' 5 Rob. Prac. p. 78. He
cites Rice v. Shute, 5 Burr. 2613; 2 Win. Bl. 695; Abbott v.
Smith, 2 Win. Bl. 947; Buller, J., in Reese v. Abbott, Cowp.
832, and Sheppard v. Ba llie, 6 T. R. 329.
Note 31, supra.
3 2 Rand. 478, 482 (1824).

29 76 Va. 169, 170-171 (1882).
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"Prior to Rice v. Shute, it appears from the same writer
that the defence of 'other joint contractors not sued', would
avail upon non-assumpsit if the defendant showed, in an action
on a sole contract, that he had promised jointly with another,
his issue was regarded as proved. If that doctrine prevailed
now, the instructions given by the court in this case could be
maintained. The cases which held that doctrine, it seems, were
decided after the action of assumpsit, was substituted for the
action of debt in cases of simple contract, and before the plea
in abatement had been introduced for that form of action. For
De Gray, C. J., says: 'Proof that another also contracted does
not prove that I did not contract.' And he observes, this
doctrine is as old as the year books. And most of the cases
to which he refers, Sir James Mansfield remarks, are cases
of debt on simple contract, which was the usual mode of declaring previous to Slade's Case. Cited 3 Rob. Prac., ch. 73,
§1, p. 389.
"But since Rice v. Shute and Abbott v. Smith, defendants,
can avail themselves of the objection only by plea in abatement. Lord Ellenborough, C. J., referring to these cases in
43 Geo. 3 (1802) said: 'That since these cases nobody can
entertain a doubt that the objection was available not only by
plea in abatement, but that it was available in that way only,
and can not be taken advantage of on the general issue.' Mr.
Robinson cites numerous cases, English and American, in support of this doctrine.
"And in his old book on practice, vol. 1. p. 163, he says
when one partner is sued alone upon a partnership transaction,
the defendant can only take advantage of it by pleading in
abatement and pointing out the other partners. His failure
to plead in abatement is a waiver of the objection. He cannot,
after pleading to issue, give evidence at the trial that there
was another partner not joined in the action. And this rule
holds, even though it should appear by the evidence that the
plaintiff knew of the partnership."
Having thus held that the instruction was wrong, the Supreme
Court remanded the case for further proceedings.
The same question arose again in Wilson and Griffith v. McCor2nick, 40 where the court says:
"The question is thus presented, whether the non-joinder
of a co-contractor as a defendant can be taken advantage of
under the general issue in an action of assitmpsit, on the ground
of a variance between the allegata and the probata, when the
omission of the co-contractor does not appear on the face of
the declaration. The circuit court by its instruction held,
in effect, that it can; but nothing is better settled than that
86 Va. 995, 11 S. E. 976 (1890).
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it cannot. The precise question was raised in Prunty v. Mitchell,
76 Va. 169, which was an action on a partnership transaction, and in which case it was held that the objection can be
taken only by plea in abatement verified by affidavit. The
failure of the defendant to plead in abatement, said the court,
was a waiver of the objection, and this rule holds in such
cases, it was added, although it should appear by the evidence
that the plaintiff knew of the partnership.
" 'This has always been the prevailing doctrine, says
Professor Minor, in respect to the action of covenant and of
debt, even on simple contracts; but from the time that, under
the sanction of Slade's case, 4 Co., 93a, the action of trespass
on the case in assumpsit came into common use as a concurrent
remedy with debt on promises to pay money, not under seal,
it was long the practice in that action to prove the nonjoinder of the co-contractor at the trial, upon the general
issue of non-assumpsit, on the notion that a variance was
thereby established between the declaration and the proofs.
This practise, however, under the influence of Lord Mansfield, was abandoned in Rice v. Shute, Burr., 2611, a case
which was followed by Abbott v. Smith, 2 Win. Bl., 947, and
has ever since prevailed in England and America.' 4 Min.
Inst. (2d ed.), marg., p. 630."
It has already been noted that the objection, under the early
common-law decisions, could be raised under the general issue, on
the theory that there was a variance between the declaration and
the proof. The later decisions hold that there is no such variance.
Without entering into an extended comparison, it may be suggested
that, if it is conceded that there is a variance where contract
plaintiffs are non-joined or misjoined, it is difficult to see why
there is not, on the same principles, a variance where contract
defendants are non-joined. True, when it is shown that A and B
promised, it is shown that A promised; but it can also be said that
X promised Y when it is proved that he promised Y and Z. Seemingly, it is in order to get around this difficulty of a variance that
the Virginia decisions have said it will be presumed that the nonjoined party did not execute the contract. But if this presumption
is sound, a demurrer ought not to be sustained when the non-joinder
is apparent on the face of the declaration. The suggestion sometimes
made that a non-joinder of defendants lies more peculiarly within
the knowledge of the defendant, and that it is only fair to the
plaintiff to compel the defendant to raise the objection as early as
possible by plea in abatement, does not remove the inconsistency,
even if true in the majority of cases. There is nevertheless a variance. Moreover, if notice to the parties of the existence of the ab-

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1922

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1922], Art. 4
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

sent party is the important thing, and if the defendant is to be
compelled to take advantage of the defect at the earliest possible
stage of the proceedings, why permit him, when the non-joinder is
apparent on the face of the declaration, to raise the objection on a
writ of error when he has failed to demur in the lower court ? These
statements are made with the purpose of showing what is believed
to be the inconsistency of the later common-law rule, but with a full
realization that the rule is now firmly and universally established,
and it likely must be conceded that it has achieved justice in its inconsistency.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals recognizes in full
the common-law rules as to the necessity of joining all joint obligora
or promisors in contract actions. In Hoffman v. Bircher,41 the.
court says:
"It is a well established rule of the common law, that the.
plaintiff upon a.joint contract, must sue all the joint contractors, and bring them before the court, and mature his.
cause against all, or if any should not be brought before the.
court he must proceed to outlawry against such defendants be-.
fore he could obtain judgment against any of them; and that
he must recover a joint judgment against all the defendants,
except such as may be discharged from liability by a defense
personal to themselves, such as infancy, bankruptcy or any
other matters which do not go to the foundation of the action,
or against none of them; and this result followed in every joint
action, whether brought upon a joint, ur upon a joint and
several obligation, for the plaintiff having elected to treat it
as joint, he took his joint remedy subject to all the incidents.
of a joint contract. .
"It is a rule equally well settled that where the contract
was several, and not joint, each of the persons severally bound,
could be sued separately; and so where the contract was several
as well as joint, the plaintiff was at liberty to treat it as a
several contract, and in that case also, he could sue the parties
so bound severally, and in both cases, recover against them
separate judgments."
The early Virginia cases already discussed may be accepted as.
establishing in West Virginia the common-law rule to the effect that
a non-joinder of contract defendants, when apparent on the face of
the declaration, may be objected to by demurrer, motion in arrest of
judgment, or on a writ of error. The question seems to have received slight consideration by the West Virginia court. It was first
In accord, see State ex rel. Kloak Bros. v. Corvin,
41 22 W. Va. 537, 542 (1883).
61 W. Va. 19, 27, 41 S. E. 211 (1902).
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considered in Reynolds v. Hurst,42 but what the court says is by
way of dicta, since the action was against one of five joint and
several obligors, and therefore did not present a case of non-joinder.
On page 654, the court says:
"If at common law a plaintiff sued upon a joint obligation made by two, whether this appeared on the face of the
declaration or when the obligation was offered in evidence, the
defendant could not take advantage of the fact by demurrer
or motion to exclude; his only remedy was by way of plea in
abatement, in which he must have alleged the joint character
of the obligation, and that the party not sued was alive. In no
other way could he take advantage of the non-joinder."
On page 655, the court says:
"I think it is conclusive from these authorities, that no
advantage whatever can be taken for non-joinder of co-obligors
except by a plea in abatement."
Since it would seem that the court is in error in stating that
non-joinder apparent on the face of the declaration can only be
reached by a plea in abatement, it is worth while to note the authorities which the court cites as making its statement "conclusive".
43
The chief authority cited is Williams' notes to Cabell v. Vaughn,
a decision in which the court was not considering a case where the
non-joinder was apparent on the face of the declaration. The West
Virginia court quotes -at some length from Serjeant Williams'
note, but stops short just before the following sentence, which
shows the incorrectness of the statement that a plea in abatement
is necessary where the non-joinder is apparent:
"If it appears on the face of the declaration, or any other
pleading of the plaintiff, that another jointly sealed the bond
with the defendant, and that both are still living, ....
the
court will arrest the judgment; because the plaintiff himself
shows that another ought to be joined, and it would be absurd
to compel the defendant to plead facts which are already
admitted. "
The other authorities equally fail to sustain the statement of the
court as to a plea in abatement being necessary where the nonjoinder of a joint co-obligor is apparent on the face of the declaration. Hence it would seem that the early Virginia decisions should
have more weight in West Virginia than these dicta, which are not
supported by the authorities cited to sustain them.
18 W. Va. 648 (1881).

4 1 Saunders 291.
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*Where the non-joinder is not apparent on the face of the declaration, the West Virginia court has consistently followed the later
connon-law rule and refused to notice the non-joinder unless
pleaded in abatement.4 4 In Scott v. Newell, 45- apparently the latest
case raising the question of non-joinder of contract defendants, the
court says:
"If there was a non-joinder it does not appear from the
declaration, and it could only have been taken advantage of
by a plea in abatement, and none was interposed; and before
such a plea could avail it would have to show that the person
who ought to have been joined is a resident of the state."
In West Virginia, not only must the non-joinder be pleaded in
abatement, but even the right to plead in abatement is limited by
statute :41
"No plea in abatement, for the non-joinder of any person
as a co-defendant, shall be allowed in any action, unless it
is stated in the plea that such person is a resident of the
state, and unless the place of residence of such person be stated
with convenient certainty in an affidavit verifying the
plea. "
The effect of this statute is, of course, that it is not necessary to
join joint obligors or promisors who are not residents of the
state. In some of the decisions, e. g., Rutter v. Sullivan, 7 there
seems to prevail an indefinite idea that this statute prescribes a
plea in abatement as the only method of objecting to a non-joinder
of defendants. Possibly this conception is responsible for the unwarranted dicta in Reynolds v. Hurst. However, a careful reading
of the statute will show that it does not say that a plea in abatement shall be used, but merely says what a plea in abatement
must contain if it is used. The statute evidently undertakes
to leave it to the common law to say when a plea in abatement is
appropriate or must be used.
The West Virginia statute 8 further provides:
"If a defendant plead in abatement that any other person
44 Rutter v. Sullivan, 25 W. Va. 427 (1885) ; McDonald v,. Cole, 46 W. Va. 186,
189, 32 S. E. 1033 (1899)
Scott v. Newell, 69 W. Va. 118, 122, 70 S. E. 1092
(1911).
See previous note.
w. VA. CODE, C. 125, § 17. It will be noted at once that this statute is based
on the STAT. 3 & 4 Wm. IV. ch. 42, s. 8, already mentioned. It was taken into the
WEST VIROINIA CODE from the Virginia Code.
See VA. CODE. 1860, c. 171,§ 20;
1849, c. 171, § 20.
47 Note 44, supra.
'8

W. VA. CODE, C. 125, § 18.

This section

is taken from the VnmGiNIA

CODE, C.

171, § 21; CODE, 1849, C. 171, § 21, and is based on STAT. 9 GEO. IV, c. 14, § 2.
Chapters 98 and 104, referred to in section 18, are the Statute of Frauds and the
Statute of Limitations, respectively.
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ought to be jointly sued, and at the trial of an issue joined on
such plea, it. appear that the action could not, by reason
of chapter ninety-eight, or chapter one hundred and four of
this Code, be maintained against such other persons, or any
of them, such issue shall be found against the defendant so
pleading."
The section of the Code immediately following reads as
follows :4
"After such plea in abatement, the plaintiff, without proceeding to trial upon an issue thereon, may amend ,his declaration, and make the persons named in such plea as joint
contractors, defendants in the case with the original defendants, and cause process to be served upon the new defendants;
and, if it appear by the subsequent pleadings in the action,
or at the trial thereof, that all the original defendants are
liable, but that one or more of the other persons named
in such plea are not liable, the plaintiff shall be entitled to
judgment, or to verdict and judgment, as the case may be,
against the defendants who appear liable; and such as are
not liable shall have judgment, and recover costs as against
the plaintiff, who shall be allowed the same as costs against
the defendants who so pleaded."
In Carlon v. Ruffner,"0 the court held that sections 18 and 19
are applicable in the case of a plea in abatement puis darrein
continuance for non-joinder of defendants. It was also held that
where the plaintiff, after issue joined, dismissed as to certain defendants whom plaintiff considered misjoined, the remaining
defendants should plead in abatement puis darrein continuance
in order to raise the defense of non-joinder of those as to whom
the action was dismissed.
It is interesting to note here an instance5 ' where a defendant,
having failed to plead a non-joinder of defendants in abatement,
undertook at the trial of the case to have them made defendants
by virtue of section 58, chapter 125, of the West Virginia Code.
This section, already discussed under non-joinder of contract
plaintiffs, reads as follows:
"Whenever in any case a complete determination of the
controversy cannot be had without the presence of other
parties, the court may cause them to be made parties to the
action or suit by amendment."

40

W. VA. CODE, c. 125. § 19. This section is taken from the VIRGINIA CODE, 1860,
C. 171, § 22; CODE, 1849, C. 171, § 22. It is based on STAT. 3 & 4 WM. IV., c.
42,§ .
00 12 W. Va. 297, 308 (1877).

R Rutter v. Sullivan, 25 W, Va. 427 (1885).
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The court, refusing the request of the defendant to make additional
parties, says:
"It is a familiar rule of construction, that all of the sections of a statute must be read together and harmonized, if
possible. It is difficult to understand precisely what is meant
by this section, which makes its first appearance in the Code of
1868. To give it the construction contended for by counsel
for the appellees would be, to hold section fourteen to have
no force or effect whatever, because the sections are in hostility
to each other; and it would be to hold, that said fifty-eighth
section not only destroys section seventeen, but that it also
entirely destroys a long established rule in pleading."
It must be said, borrowing the language of the court, that
it is difficult to understand precisely the application of the court's
argument. Section 14 mentioned by the court relates to curing
misnomers, and is in absolute harmony with section 58, having the
same remedial purpose as the latter section. Apparently, the
court looks upon section 17 as confining the defendant to his
remedy by plea in abatement. If this were true it might be in conflict with section 58; but it has already been noted that this is
not true. As to the argument that the construction asked by the
defendant would destroy "a long established rule in pleading",
it may be replied that likely that was the very object of the statute.
It will be noted that the statute uses the word "action" as well as
"suit"; and it is worth noticing that in equity suits the court
already had power independently of the statute to admit new
parties, and hence that the legislature could have had little purpose
in enacting such a statute to be applied to equity suits alone.
However, it is possible that the general drift of the court's argument, although based upon poor reasoning, to the effect that the
defendant should be confined to his plea in abatement if he desired to make ne.v parties, is sound. One explanation for so
confining him is that it would work a surprise upon the plaintiff
to compel him to make an amendment at the trial. Moreover, it
should be noted that the defendant, not the plaintiff, is asking
for the new parties; and that, on the common-law theory that the
defendant has waived the non-joinder by failing to plead in
abatement, the plaintiff may proceed to judgment without bringing in the non-joined parties. Hence it may be said, in the very
language of section 58, that "a complete determination of the
controversy" may be had without the addition of new parties.
(Continued in June Issue).
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